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We report a demonstration of quantum key distribution (QKD) over a standard telecom fiber
exceeding 50 dB in loss and 250 km in length. The differential phase shift QKD protocol was
chosen and implemented with 2 GHz system clock rate. By careful optimization of the 1-bit de-
layed Faraday-Michelson interferometer and the use of the super-conducting single photon detector
(SSPD), we achieved a quantum bit error rate below 2% when the fiber length was no more than
205 km, and of 3.45% for the 260 km length fiber with 52.9 dB loss. We also improved the quantum
efficiency of SSPD to obtain high key rate for 50 km length.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two remote
participants to share unconditionally secure keys based
on the principles of quantum physics [1–3]. Combined
with one-time pad encryption, QKD is hopeful to effec-
tively end the cat and mouse game between the guardians
of secrets and their enemies [4], and has become one of the
most dynamic research fields. After the past two decades
of developments, experimental QKD has achieved signif-
icant improvements, the transmission distance from 32
cm [5] to 250 km [6], the speed (or system clock rate)
from 200 Hz [5] to 10 GHz [7–9].
With the dispersion-shifted fiber, Takesue et al. re-
alized the first QKD experiment over 42.1 dB channel
loss and 200 km of distance [8]. Then, with the ultra low
loss fiber, Stucki et al. implemented the first QKD exper-
iment over 250 km of distance, but the channel loss is still
42.6 dB [6]. In this letter, focused on the transmission
over the widely used standard (ITU-T G.652) telecom
fiber, of which loss coefficient is about 0.2 dB/km and
dispersion is about 17 ps/(km · nm) at 1550 nm region,
we report a QKD experiment over 260 km of this stan-
dard telecom fiber with 52.9 dB channel loss. This is the
first QKD experiment exceeding 50 dB in channel loss
and 250 km in length.
We chose the differential phase shift QKD (DPS-
QKD) protocol [10] to be implemented with 2 GHz rate.
The experimental setup is outlined in Fig. 1, includ-
ing the transmitter – Alice, quantum channel, and re-
ceiver – Bob. At Alice’s site, a continuous wave (CW)
laser, whose central wavelength is 1560.2 nm, is first
modulated into a pulse train by an intensity modula-
tor (IM). The phase modulator (PM) randomly encodes
{−pi
2
, pi
2
} on each pulse, and the followed variable atten-
uator (VA) attenuates the average photon number per
pulse to the optimal value. Alice’s pattern generator
(PG) has three outputs – narrow pulse with 2 GHz rate
to IM, pseudo-random data to PM and 0.5 MHz sync
signals to Bob. The quantum channel is the standard
telecom fiber (STF). A 3-port optical circulator (CIR) at
Bob’s site is put before his 2-GHz, 1-bit delayed Faraday-
Michelson interferometer (FMI), which makes one pulse
interfere with pulses before and after it. The two outputs
of the FMI are connected with a double-channel super-
conducting single photon detector (SSPD), of which D0
channel clicks if the phase difference between two adja-
cent pulses is 0, D1 channel clicks if the phase difference
is pi. Both sync signals and electrical pulses from SSPD
are sent to the time-to-digit convertor (TDC). Once TDC
records a click event, Bob and Alice can share one sifted
key bit. Note that although we transmitted the sync sig-
nal via a cable in the lab, the best way to transmit the
sync signal is over the quantum channel.
FIG. 1: (Color online) Schematic of the DPS-QKD setup.
Suppose the insertion loss (IL) of Bob’s detection setup
and the effective detection efficiency (EDE) of SSPD are
α
IL
and η
D
, the overall transmission and detection effi-
ciency between Alice and Bob can be expressed as [11]
η = η
D
· 10−
α·l+α
IL
10 , (1)
here α and l are the loss coefficient and the length of
the fiber respectively. Let µ denote the average photon
number per pulse set by Alice, the probability that one
click event happens is given by
pclick ≈ psignal + pdark, (2)
where the signal contribution is psignal = 1 − e
−µη, the
dark count contribution is pdark = 2 ·D ·tW , here D is the
dark count rate (DCR) of Bob’s detector, and t
W
is the
measurement time window of the system [12]. Consider-
ing the dead time of the detection system td, the sifted
key rate could be expressed as [13]
Rsifted = f · pclick · e
−f ·pclick·td , (3)
2where f is the repetition rate of transmission. If the
probability that a signal hit the wrong detector is es,
which is the baseline system error rate [12], the quantum
bit error rate (QBER) is given by
e =
es · psignal + ed · pdark
pclick
, (4)
where ed = 0.5 means the dark count contribution is
random. Finally, the secure key rate under general indi-
vidual attacks is given by [14]
Rsecure = Rsifted · {τ − f(e) ·H2(e)}, (5)
where τ = −(1− 2µ)log2[1− e
2− (1− 6e)2/2] is the com-
pression factor in the privacy amplification process, f(x)
characterizes the efficiency of error correction algorithm,
and H2(x) is the binary Shannon entropy. In order to
get a tighter security threshold [15], f(e) in this paper
was chosen as 1.2. Using equations from (1) to (5), we
can maximize the secure key rate by setting optimal µ
for the specific experimental setup.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Quantum bit error rate (QBER) with-
out phase modulation and active compensation.
Bob’s experimental setup includes three main parts
– the Faraday-Michelson interferometer, the super-
conducting single photon detector, and the time-to-digit
convertor. (i) One 50/50 beam splitter (BS) and two
Faraday mirrors (FM) constitute FMI, the Faraday mir-
ror which is a combination of a 45 degree Faraday rotator
and an ordinary mirror could automatically compensate
for any birefringence effect in fiber [16], so the 2-GHz, 1-
bit delayed FMI is almost insensitive to polarization.The
interferometer was insulated from the environment and
actively compensated by piezoelectric ceramics for bet-
ter interference. Without phase modulation and active
compensation, the mean QBER was about 0.65% over
2450 seconds (Fig. 2). However, when we added random
phase modulation signal on the phase modulator, QBER
increased to 1.80%, which was the value of es in equation
(4). The IL of Bob’s detection setup is about 1.5 dB, in-
cluding the IL of CIR (from port 1 to port 2) and FMI.
(ii) The double-channel SSPD was made by Scontel Ltd.
from Russia, and worked with a refrigeration system [17]
which could obtain a temperature of 1.7 K. The detector
had a counting rate more than 70 MHz, and a jitter value
better than 50 ps. By carefully increasing the bias cur-
rent, we achieved 3.0% average quantum efficiency with 1
Hz DCR. (iii) The TDC not only recorded the sync and
SSPD signals, but also set the measurement time window
t
W
during the experiment. The value t
W
was set to 200
ps, and this set reduced the quantum efficiency by 17%.
The dead time of TDC is 15 ns, which is the value of
dead time of the whole detection system.
Based on these specific experimental parameters, the
secure key rate under individual attacks could be max-
imized by choosing optimal µ for each fiber length, and
the attainable maximum distance is 281 km (with 0.2
dB/km loss coefficient) in principle (Blue dot line in Fig.
3). With standard telecom fiber, the sifted key rates and
QBERs were measured at seven different fiber lengths –
10 km, 50 km, 75 km, 100 km, 150 km, 205 km, and 260
km. We set µ = 0.19 for 10 km and 50 km fiber length,
and µ = 0.20 for other length values.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Experimental results of DPS-QKD.
The dark count rate of detectors is a major limiting
factor for long-distance QKD [6]. Therefore the ultra
low-noise SSPD was used in our DPS-QKD system. We
first set the EDE and DCR of SSPD at 2.5% and 1 Hz
respectively, and the measurement results were shown as
open shapes in Fig. 3. For each data, we ran the QKD
process ten times, and each run lasted ten minutes. The
measured QBERs and sifted key rates are the average val-
ues of the ten runs, but secure key rates are calculated
results by equation (5). Through careful optimization of
the 1-bit delayed interferometer, we achieved the values
of QBER below 2% for the first six lengths, and of 3.45%
for the 260 km length fiber with 52.9 dB loss (Red open
circles in Fig. 3). At 10 km and 50 km fiber length, 1.16
Mbits/s and 185 kbits/s secure key rate under individual
attacks were achieved. At 205 km with 41.6 dB transmis-
sion loss, 99.2 bits/s secure key rate was obtained, this
3rate value was more than eight times of that achieved in
10-GHz DPS-QKD experiment at 200 km with 42.1 dB
loss [8]. Although the channel loss of 260 km was one or-
der of magnitude larger than the loss 42.6 dB in previous
250 km QKD experiment [6], in which the ultra low loss
fiber with 0.164 dB/km loss coefficient was used, secure
keys with 1.85 bits/s rate could still be shared between
Alice and Bob.
When the transmission fiber length was short, the sig-
nal contribution psignal was much larger than the dark
count contribution pdark. In order to get higher key
rate, we improved the quantum efficiency of SSPD by in-
creasing the bias current, though the dark count rate in-
creased faster as the current increased. In the 50 km fiber
length experiment, another η
D
= 11.2% value was tested,
QBER was 1.89%, and the corresponding secure key rate
got up to 0.81 Mbits/s, which was close to Dixon’s BB84
experiment [18].
For the QKD system over long distance, the nonzero
accumulated chromatic dispersion of standard telecom
fiber would severely limit the performance of QKD, es-
pecially for gigahertz systems [19]. The optical pulses are
broadened during propagation through the optical fiber,
so photons would spread outside the measurement time
window, which reduces the effective quantum efficiency,
and even overlap with photons of neighbor pulses, which
degrades the encoded signal. Take the 10-GHz QKD sys-
tem for example, in which pulses are separated by 100 ps,
while the dispersion is up to 153 ps after propagating in
25 km single mode fiber [12], so the dispersion-shifted
fiber was used in [7] and [8]. In our experiment, the full
width at half maximum of the 2-GHz pulse train was
170 ps, this wide width limited the effects of chromatic
dispersion to some extent. Fig. 3 shows that the mea-
sured sifted key rates (or counting rates) deviate from
the simulation results, and the reduction increases as the
fiber length increases. At 205 km transmission distance,
the measured sifted key rate was 69.1% of the simula-
tion one. The transmission loss 41.6 dB was higher than
0.2 × 205 dB, and the set average photon number 0.20
was a little bit larger than the optimum one (0.19776).
After removing effects of these differences, there was still
20.8% reduction. The chromatic dispersion of the fiber
was the main cause of this reduction.
In summary, we have experimentally demonstrated
that quantum key distribution is possible over 260 km
standard telecom fiber with 52.9 dB loss. Using the ul-
tra low loss fiber with 0.164 dB/km loss coefficient [6],
the quantum key exchange over 340 km distance is in
sight.
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